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THE ARTIST AS SACRIFICIAL IN SCHOPENHAUER’S PHILOSOPHY 
 
REBECCAH STEPHENY LEIBY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines a potential tension between Schopenhauer’s portrayal of art as a 
palliative measure undertaken in response to a fundamentally and necessarily painful 
existence, and the implicit image he sketches of the artist as suffering in order to 
precipitate this palliative measure.  I begin by outlining Schopenhauer’s larger 
philosophical project in order to contextualize subsequent discussions of his aesthetics.  
Having laid this expository groundwork, I proceed to explore the concept of sacrifice as 
Schopenhauer was likely to have understood and utilized it, drawing on both textual 
evidence (primarily from The World as Will and Representation) and contextual evidence 
(given the religious, cultural, and intellectual climate at the time of its writing).  This 
strategy of twofold exploration — that is , both textual and contextual — is deployed 
again in the third portion of this thesis, clarifying the role of “the artist” qua artist for 
Romantic Era Germans more broadly and for Schopenhauer more narrowly.  In the final 
section, I utilize these earlier explorations to show that the artist is indeed a sacrificial 
figure in Schopenhauer’s work.  Regardless of the fact that Schopenhauer does not 
confirm the artist-as-sacrificial paradigm explicitly, the claim can be made that he does 
— and indeed, must — tacitly accept it. 
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1  
INTRODUCTION  
  
  “Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must 
entirely fail of its aim” — so begins Schopenhauer’s 1851 essay, “On the Suffering of the 
World.” The reader must be struck by both the extremity and the confidence of this 
claim, and requires little else to understand why Schopenhauer’s contemporary reputation 
is one of unabashed pessimism, an almost laughable lugubriousness. Our emotional and 
intellectual reaction to such a claim is almost involuntary: If suffering is such a 
fundamental and omnipresent component of the human experience, why do choose to go 
on living, to go on reproducing? How do we account for moments of genuine happiness, 
or feelings of genuine hope? and so forth. At first glance, Schopenhauer’s position on the 
nature of existence seems far too outlandish to receive any consideration past outright 
dismissal.  
  Upon closer examination, however, we cannot help but note that the viability of 
such questions is not proof of the absence of the ubiquitous suffering of which  
Schopenhauer speaks, but rather evidence of the possibility of respite from it. That we do 
indeed go on living, go on reproducing, go on hoping and experiencing moments of 
genuine happiness demonstrates only that suffering can be mitigated, and it is with one 
such method of mitigation (aesthetics) that this thesis is primarily concerned.  
 Schopenhauer offers two possible avenues whereby we can transcend, however 
fleetingly, the misery of human existence. The first of these ways is the “ascetic 
lifestyle,” characterized by a process of casting off bodily desires and a denial of 
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embodied will. Schopenhauer advocates this course at length in the fourth book of The 
World as Will and Representation. Yet, as Vasalou notes,  
  
This drastic “ascetic” solution was hard to achieve, and harder still to 
sustain. A second road, however, stood open — an offer of temporary, if 
not permanent, salvation... This was the “aesthetic” solution, which 
proposed aesthetic contemplation as a temporary means by which 
suffering could be suspended, and the human subject be “lifted” above the 
strivings of the will. (Vasalou, 22)  
  
In this way, art is presented in Schopenhauer’s philosophy as a palliative measure 
through which life is made more bearable. As we shall see in Chapter One, art fits 
seamlessly into this role in the context of Schopenhauer’s comprehensive 
philosophical project. Interestingly, however, Schopenhauer’s discussion of art-
creation and art-experience revolves primarily around the latter. We see very little of 
the artist himself.  Thus statements about the value of the aesthetic experience are 
fundamentally one-sided, focused upon the recipient of the artwork as opposed to the 
manufacturer.  
What of the artist? What does he experience during, and after, the creation act?  
  In the following chapters, I explore a potential tension between Schopenhauer’s 
portrayal of art as salvific and his portrayal — or, in the very least, outline — of the artist 
as a suffering individual. We can make the case, with textual evidence from  
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Schopenhauer’s writings and contextual evidence from the culture in which he moved, 
that Schopenhauer and his contemporaries were likely to have considered suffering to be 
a fundamental quality of the artist. If we consider this in the same breath as  
Schopenhauer’s description of art as palliative, then we must accept that we (the 
observers) are being elevated at the emotional expense of the artist (the creator). Given 
this dynamic, we might make the case that the artist suffers in order that the rest of us 
might gain some respite from the pain of existence. In this capacity, the artist as he is 
understood in Schopenhauer’s philosophy could accurately be considered sacrificial.  
  The opening chapter of this paper consists of a brief discourse on Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical framework, offered as a means of contextualizing subsequent claims about 
his more specific positions on art and suffering. In Chapter Two, I explore the concept of 
sacrifice as Schopenhauer was likely to have understood and utilized it, drawing upon 
both his explicit references to the concept and the unstated influences which surrounded 
his intellectual development. Chapter Three paints a portrait of Schopenhauer’s artist, 
again deploying an exploration founded on both textual and contextual evidence. In  
Chapter Four, I show that the stated and implied qualities of Schopenhauer’s artist 
significantly overlap with the properties of a sacrificial figure. To be sure, he does not 
explicitly affirm the artist-as-sacrificial paradigm. Nevertheless, there is both strong 
evidence for his tacit embrace of this paradigm and compelling reasons, internal to his 
philosophy, for him to do so. In this way, I advance the fundamental argument of the 
thesis — namely, that Schopenhauer’s philosophy entails suffering and, thereby, a 
sacrifice on the part of the artist.  In the final chapter, I underscore the value and 
4  
significance of such an interpretation in the context of contemporary ethical 
considerations and Schopenhauer scholarship at large.  
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Chapter One: Schopenhauer’s Philosophical Framework  
  
Before we can make more sophisticated claims about Schopenhauer’s view on art 
and the role of the artist, we must briefly explore the architecture of his overall 
philosophical project. We shall proceed, for sake of coherence, in the order in which 
Schopenhauer himself presents his claims, focusing first upon epistemology and 
ontology, before turning to aesthetics, the central focus of this thesis. A thorough 
exploration of each of these pillars of his philosophical structure will allow us, in turn, to 
supply more context to our discussion of the artist. For the duration of this exploration, 
and throughout this thesis, it is useful to bear in mind the mass of cultural and intellectual 
heritage that is at Schopenhauer’s back. It is no accident that engagement with  
Schopenhauer’s work by contemporary scholars make much of the influence of Plato and 
Kant. Although there is the occasional implication of Schopenhauer misunderstanding 
their tenets,1 there is no denying that two convictions regarding their contributions are 
deeply ingrained in Schopenhauer’s approach to philosophy at large. First, he is 
convinced that both Plato and Kant were on to something vitally important, though they 
stopped short of articulating it. Second, he regarded his contemporaries in Germany and 
abroad catastrophically inept and intentionally obscurative. In his 1847 preface to the 
second edition of The Fourfold Root, Schopenhauer takes Hegel particularly to task, 
saying, “Thus German philosophy stands before us loaded with contempt, ridiculed by 
                                                 
1 Heidegger suggests that, for all  of Schopenhauer’s supposed estimation of Kant, “he thoroughly 
misunderstands him” (Nietzsche, Vol. I, 107).  
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other nations, expelled from all honest science” (TFR, xxviii). It is with a sense of 
shouldering the great burden and responsibility of rectifying this state of affairs that  
Schopenhauer embarks upon his philosophical project.  
  
1.1 Epistemology: The World as Presentation  
Schopenhauer opens his philosophical discourse in The World as Will and 
Representation precisely where we might expect him to, by reiterating the idealism of 
Kant and indicating where he wishes to develop it further. With the opening line — “The 
world is a presentation to me” (WWRI 31, 3g) — Schopenhauer commits himself to the 
idealism to which Kant gave birth. When he speaks of Kant as having shown that 
experiences (phenomena) and things- in-themselves (noumena) are distinct, he is adopting 
the Kantian conviction that the natural world is ideal rather than real.  
  
For Schopenhauer… Kant’s greatest merit is his proof that since “between 
things and us there always stands the intellect (the “veil of Maya” as the 
Upanishads calls it), that which is accessible to us in everyday experience 
is “appearance” or “phenomenon”, not the thing- in- itself. So we cannot 
discover whatness of things just by looking. The whatness of the world is 
in some sense “beyond” what we can look at. (Young, 18)  
  
Put another way, the information upon which we build our conceptions of the world — 
comprised of our sensory input, “everything that is objective, extended, effectual… 
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material” (WWRI 31, 3g) — is necessarily run through a sort of mental filter on its way 
to us. It “has passed through the machinery and workings of the brain and thus entered 
into the latter’s forms, time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is in the first place 
displayed as extended in space and effectual in time” (WWRI 59, 33g). Given this, all we 
can say with absolute certainty about the concepts that come out on our end of the mental 
machinery, is that they relay how we perceive the world to be. “Awareness” of, say, color 
or shape or duration does not bring us any closer to fully comprehending the thing- in-
itself, though we might mistake it for having done as much. Rather, suggests 
Schopenhauer, it indicates the presence of a necessary distance which Kant took to be 
self-evident. We can experience our world only through this lens, but the lens necessarily 
distorts all information passing through it, rendering true access to the world-in-itself 
beyond our reach.   
  All perception, then, is merely presentation: “the human intellect ‘creates’ the 
world of ordinary material things, and does so by applying the principle of cause and 
effect to sensations received by our bodily senses” (Janaway, Schopenhauer 21). In order 
to truly understand what Schopenhauer means by “presentation,” we must consider  
Schopenhauer’s first published work, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason. Written as his doctoral thesis, The Fourfold Root functions as the intellectual 
origination point for much of Schopenhauer’s mature philosophy. It is designed as an 
exploration of the so-called “principle of sufficient reason,” which states that “Nothing is 
without a reason for its being” (TFR, 5). This exploration is fourfold, focusing upon 
causal necessities, logical necessities, mathematical necessities, and moral necessities 
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(Janaway, Schopenhauer 20). It is the first of these (causal necessity) that becomes 
particularly relevant in discussions of presentation in the opening of The World as Will 
and Representation. For Schopenhauer, the material world is created by our ability to 
apply the concept of causal relationships to the various stimuli which we apprehend 
through our bodily senses. “Thus it is from sensations of our body that we receive the 
data for the very first application of the causal law, and it is precisely by that application 
that the perception of this class of objects arise” (TFR, 98). In this capacity, it would be 
wrong to say that any material object exists objectively. For Schopenhauer, such an 
object exists only insofar as it is created — or “presented” to us — by the interplay 
between our bodily senses and our intellectual adherence to the laws of causality.  
Kant’s tacit resignation to the fact that we can never access the thing- in- itself — 
that is, reality untampered with by the spatiotemporal machinery of our minds — proves 
problematic for Schopenhauer. He agrees with his predecessor that the existence of the 
object relies upon the existence of the subject, but rejects the implication that the 
existence of the object is necessary (WWRI 62, 36g). Rather, he suggests that the  
“objective” world is merely one component of the whole, like the crust of a planetary 
sphere which is utterly different in kind from the planetary core (the thing- in- itself). The 
mistake of Western philosophy, Schopenhauer offers, was that it attempted to generalize 
theories about the “crust” to the nature of the “core.” It attempted to maintain the 
existence of the subjective self when speaking of the noumenal world, but, for  
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Schopenhauer, no such self can exist in tandem with the glimpsed thing- in- itself. At the 
“core” of the world, there is a “better consciousness”2 — no subjective self, no ego, no 
mental machinery through which external input must pass; it is the place which Kant deems 
inaccessible, and which Schopenhauer, early in his philosophical career, came to be believe 
he had discovered.  
  In the years leading up to the publication of The World as Will and  
Representation, Schopenhauer came to believe that the will was Kant’s thing- in- itself.  
  
1.2 Ontology: The World as Will  
By the close of the first book of The World as Will and Representation, the foundations 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophical landscape are clearly established. We understand, at 
least in theory, that our idea of the material world is just that, an idea. We understand that 
the existence of the objective world relies upon the existence of our subjective Self, and 
therefore understand that the world we experience is merely a presentation of our own 
intellectual mechanism, a projection bound by the rules in accordance with which our 
brains must operate as a necessary condition of embodiment.  
  In the second book, Schopenhauer takes up the subjective half of this dynamic:  
what am I? The human being “is himself rooted in that world, finds himself in it, namely, 
as an individual, i.e., his cognition, which is the conditioning bearer of the entire world as 
                                                 
2 As Janaway points out, Schopenhauer abandons the “better consciousness” terminology fairly early on 
in his unpublished manuscripts, but he maintains the foundational principles, if not the phrase, 
throughout his mature discussions of the value of art. See particular ly Schopenhauer: A Very Short 
Discussion, pp. 16-19.  
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presentation, is nonetheless altogether mediated by a body whose affections are, as has 
been shown, the understanding’s point of departure for the perception of the world” 
(WWRI 136, 118g). Whatever doubts we may have about the reality of the material 
world are doubts which cannot extend to our own existence — here we are, after all, 
doubting. The existence of an object thus requires the existence of a subject. Given this 
claim, we might ask, what qualities are fundamental to the subject?  
  It may be helpful to engage in a tangential discussion of the congruencies between 
the individual and the world. In the previous section, we spoke of the ideal and real 
worlds as the crust and core, respectively, of a proverbial planetary sphere. On a 
microcosmic scale, Schopenhauer’s concept of the individual human being is quite 
similar. The “crust,” subjective consciousness, is comprised of all of the prosaic and 
complex components of personhood: hopes, fears, inclinations, convictions, and so forth. 
The “core,” however, is comprised of one element alone, and that element is will. All of 
the more intricate and elaborate manifestations of personhood, the stuff of the crust, are, 
Schopenhauer suggests, merely extension of this will.  
  At first glance, it may be tempting to reduce will to mere motivation — I want 
this book, so I reach out and pick it up —  but Schopenhauer has something much more 
fundamental in mind. He does not consider willing to be activity of the mind, but rather, 
an activity of the mind and body simultaneously.  
  
Every true act of will is at once and inevitably also a movement of its 
body: it cannot actually will an act without at the same time perceiving 
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that it makes its appearance as a movement of the body. The act of will 
and action of the body are not two distinct objectively cognized states that 
are connected by the bond of causality, do not stand as the relation of 
cause and effect, but they are rather one and the same, only given in two 
entire distinct manners… Actions of the body are nothing other than 
objectified acts of will… (WWRI 137, 119g)  
  
The human body, then, is at once an externally perceived object (a presentation) and 
willing objectified: “teeth, gullet, and intestinal tract are objectified hunger; genitals are 
the objectified sex drive; grasping hands, dashing feet already correspond to a more 
highly mediated striving than of the will they display” (WWRI 145, 127g).   In 
this sense, Schopenhauer suggests, human beings are precisely the same as lower 
animals who, driven by instinct, reproduce, sustain, and defend themselves. One a pre-
conscious level, without being able to formalize or even fully comprehend what we 
hope to accomplish, we are driven to seek our own perpetuation. The sole end of will is 
to continue willing; our most basic and strongest drive is to survive for the sake of 
continued survival.  
  Built into such a world is the necessary existence of misery, and it is with this 
claim that Schopenhauer sets the stage for the second half of his masterwork. “All willing 
originates from need, thus from lack, thus from suffering… Even final satisfaction is 
itself only illusory: fulfilled desire makes way at once for a new one; the former is an 
error that has, the latter still has not, entered one’s cognizance. No object of willing, once 
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attained, can give lasting unabated satisfaction, but it is always only like alms tossed to a 
beggar, gets him by for another day of life so as to renew his torment tomorrow” (WWRI 
240, 231g). Schopenhauer’s picture of the world is thus an unapologetically dreary one. 
It plunges us into direct confrontation with the orderlessness and meaninglessness which 
Schopenhauer takes to be a fundamental fact of existence. The world is a terrible and 
terrifying place, he tells us, and we struggle to exist within it merely because it is in our 
most fundamental, will-driven nature to do so. Our lot is endless striving; this will never 
get easier, reads Schopenhauer’s central lesson, we will never ‘have arrived’, 
“everything in life proclaims that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated, or 
recognized as an illusion” (WWRII 573, 586g).  
1.3 Aesthetics  
Julian Young likens the structure of The World as Will and Representation to that of a 
valley, the first two books descending into despair and the latter two rising with 
reassurance. At the conclusion of the section on the will, we find ourselves face-to-face 
with the futility of existence. It seems particularly significant that in this moment, when 
things are at their darkest, and the reader is likely to be casting about for some degree of 
comfort in Schopenhauer’s notoriously pessimistic philosophy, he brings us to a 
discussion of art.  
  The main question posed by the third book is: what is art? Schopenhauer does not 
mean this in the trifling, modern sense of the question, with which so many theories of 
art concern themselves (“Does Duchamp’s Fountain count as art? Does photography? 
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Does documentary?” etc.). When he wonders about art, he is wondering what it is about 
great art that makes it so deeply meaningful. In attempting to answer this question, he 
does not focus on a laundry list of attributes and the often seemingly arbitrary divide 
between fine art and art as entertainment. Instead, he offers a deceptively simple 
response: the quality that makes great art great is its capacity to inspire the spectator 
towards the “aesthetic state.” The origin point of art “is cognizance of Ideas, its single 
goal communication of this cognizance” (WWRI 228, 217g).  
  How does “cognizance of Ideas” differ from “ordinary cognizance?” For  
Schopenhauer, the latter is a state firmly grounded in interest. The embodied individual, 
taking in enormous quantities of sensory data every second, must be equipped with some 
method of dividing useful information from useless. Our brains accomplish this division 
automatically, as a result of evolutionary heritage, based upon what incoming 
information is likely to prove advantageous in our struggle for survival. Put simply, the 
information that passes through the lens of our perception is eternally being examined 
exclusively in terms of self-interest.  
  The effect of this process is the necessary dilution of what is perceived. While this 
process proves vital for our continued survival, both as individuals and as a species, it is 
fundamental to the deep dissatisfaction that we experience. Such an absolute 
preoccupation with self-interest can never come to fruition, in a world such as  
Schopenhauer’s, because there will always be more to will, more towards which to strive. 
In order to shed this dissatisfaction, Schopenhauer suggests, we must shed our interest 
altogether; that is, we must experience the world free of the trappings of personal 
14  
perpetuation. Schopenhauer speaks of this passage as one “from ordinary cognizance of 
individual things to cognizance of Ideas” (WWRI 221, 209g), where “Ideas” can be 
understood in the Platonic sense.3  
  Schopenhauer sketches the process of coming to the cognizance of Ideas as 
follows:  
  
Lifted by the power of spirit, one abandons the usual way of regarding 
things, stops merely pursuing relations among them… and thus no longer 
considers the Where, the When, the Why, the Whither of things, but 
simply and solely the What, nor lets abstract thinking, concepts of reason, 
consciousness occupy one’s thinking; but instead of all this, one devotes 
the entire power of spirit to perception, becomes entirely absorbed in the 
latter and lets the entirety of consciousness be filled with restful 
contemplation… entirely losing oneself, to employ a pregnant German 
expression, in this object, i.e. precisely forgetting the individual one is, 
one’s will, and remaining only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the 
object… (WWRI 221, 210g)  
  
                                                 
3 “I thus understand by Idea any particular fixed level of objectification of will, so far as the latter is thing 
in itself and thus foreign to plurality, which levels of course relate to individual thi ngs as their eternal 
forms, or their paradigms” (WWRI 170, 154g).  
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In comparison to the bleak picture painted by the first two books, such serene detachment 
certainly seems preferable. “What mode of cognition,” asks Schopenhauer, “is concerned 
with that aspect of the world which is alone truly essential, standing beyond and 
independent of all relation?” (WWRI 228, 217g) His answer: art. In ordinary cognizance, 
I am the center of my own universe; in aesthetic cognizance, I am a mere observer, 
unmoved by the desires of embodiment and content simply to perceive.  
  Here, a potential objection presents itself. Since the subject is still present, bodily 
and mentally, during an experience of great art, wouldn’t the artwork be as much a 
presentation as anything else? Aren’t we still removed from the thing-in- itself? Certainly, 
says Schopenhauer:  
  
The Platonic Idea… is necessarily an object, something of which there is 
cognizance, a presentation, and precisely thereby, but also only thereby, 
different from the thing in itself. It has merely shed the subordinate forms 
pertaining to the phenomenon, all of which we comprehend under the 
Principle of Sufficient [Reason], or rather has not yet entered into them, 
but it has retained the first and most general form, that of presentation in 
general, of being object for a subject. … Thus in turn, the Principle of 
Sufficient [Reason] is the form taken by Ideas insofar as they fall within 
the cognizance of the subject as an individual. (WWRI 217, 206g)  
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Thus, for Schopenhauer, the trappings of presentation are unavoidable if the subject 
remains unchanged. We cannot but filter our perceptions of the world through the 
distortive mental machinery. The only scenario in which we can transcend the barrier of 
presentation is a scenario in which “the subject, so far as it is cognizant of the Idea, is no 
longer an individual” (WWRI 219, 207g). Such a transformation occurs precisely when I 
shed ordinary cognizance for aesthetic cognizance. “The possible passage… from 
ordinary cognizance of individual things to cognizance of Ideas occurs suddenly, with 
cognizance tearing itself away from the service of will. Just be the fact that the subject 
ceases to be merely individual and is now the pure, will- less subject of cognition, which 
no longer pursues relations according to the Principle of Sufficient [Reason], but rests in 
constant contemplation of the given object beyond its interconnection with any others, 
and gets absorbed therein” (WWRI 221, 209g).  
  With this distinction between presentations subject to the principle of sufficient 
reason and cognizance of Ideas having been established, we might consider a second 
objection. If aesthetic cognizance is will- less, and the will is at the root of all subjective 
consciousness, then how are we capable of feeling pleasure during the experience of a 
great artwork? Shouldn’t our capacity for pleasure, like our capacity for pain, evaporate 
with our entrance into such a state? Not at all, says Schopenhauer, for “happiness, 
gratification, is of a negative nature, namely the mere cessation of suffering… Thus when 
all desire disappears from consciousness there still remains the condition of pleasure, i.e., 
the absence of pain…” (PP, 9). It is useful to conceive of aesthetic cognizance, therefore, 
not as a “filling-with-some-non-will-x,” but rather as a complete and absolute emptying 
17  
of the self. Faced with a great work of art, the human being becomes, in some sense, 
hollow, equally free of desire and of dread. This language of “emptying” has significant 
implications for discussions of the intersection between Schopenhauer’s artist and 
sacrifice, as we shall see in Chapter Four.    
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Chapter Two: A Brief Discussion of Sacrifice  
  
Before we can make any substantive claims about Schopenhauer’s understanding 
of where, and even if, denial-of-will intersects with “sacrifice,” we must clarify the 
parameters of the concept as it pertains to his relevant view on the subject. Schopenhauer 
himself never offers an explicit account of his views on the nature of sacrifice. Given 
cultural and intellectual context, however, and the textual evidence in his primary work, a 
general picture of how Schopenhauer envisioned sacrifice — especially during the 
formative philosophical years which culminated in the writing of The World as Will and  
Representation — emerges.  
  
2.1 Historical, Cultural, and Religious Context for the Concept of Sacrifice  
The concept of sacrifice is multifarious, and definitions of it vary substantially across 
religious and philosophical literature. Generally, however, we can separate sacrifice into 
two basic historical types: (1) literal sacrifice, which relies upon narrowly-focused 
physical violence, and (2) figurative sacrifice, which relies upon the connection of 
virtue and self-effacement. In the context of these two variations, we consider sacrifice 
in the context of the Western culture in which Schopenhauer lived, and the Eastern 
culture by which Schopenhauer was influenced.  
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2.1.1 Sacrifice in the West  
Despite Schopenhauer’s lack of explicit engagement with the concept of sacrifice, the 
concept was deeply ingrained in the culture in which he moved. There is ample evidence 
in the Western tradition of the truth of the observation: “Sacrifice is a fundamental 
component of the human imaginary” (Hedley, 2). Rich examples of the image of sacrifice 
can be found in both literal and figurative capacities in even the earliest recorded 
Western thought, from the prosaic offering up of animals in the Greco-Roman world, to 
the near slaying of Isaac by Abraham in the New Testament, to the humanity-cleansing 
crucifixion of Jesus Christ in the New Testament, and so on. A vital question follows 
from such a list of instances: Is there a difference in kind between ancient (pagan) and 
modern (Christian) concepts of sacrifice? In other words, is it possible to trace an 
evolution of the concept of sacrifice from the earliest instances in the West to the post-
Kantian philosophical tradition?  
  For Hedley, “sacrifice in the strict ritual sense is generally limited to ancient or 
archaic societies” (Hedley, 2). The ancient Greco-Roman world is no exception to this 
rule, as is evinced in the language used to describe sacrifice and victimization  
(particularly of animals). “The Greek for animal victim, already found in Bronze Age  
Linear B, is hiereion, “the holy object”: the Latin word victima also comes from an Indo- 
European root meaning “holy” (Jones, 61). Early sacrifice thus manifested itself as a kind 
of metaphysical currency, rendered to the gods or God as a means to end. Bubbio 
describes this early version of sacrifice (that is, literal sacrifice) as “the suppression or 
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the destruction of something for the sake of something else” (Bubbio, 141), and it is 
generally this version of sacrifice that we think of when we think of traditional sacrifice.  
With the advent of Christianity, however, sacrifice took on a new set of implications.  
  
Once exposed, as it is in the Bible and the Gospels, the mechanisms of 
victimization can no longer function as the model for would be sacrificers. 
If the term sacrifice is used for the death of Jesus, it is in a sense 
absolutely contrary to the archaic sense. Jesus consents to die in order to 
reveal the lie of blood sacrifices and to render them henceforth impossible. 
The Christian notion of redemption must be interpreted on the basis of this 
reversal (Girard, xi).  
  
Thus, in Western religion, sacrifice underwent a bifurcation into both an offering-up for 
benefit and an issue of personal comportment. Sacrifice in the Christian tradition ceased 
to be an inquiry into what can be gained, and rather became an inquiry into what can, 
and should, be lost. The language of sacrifice, therefore, moves from the external to the 
internal, from the suppressive to the kenotic.4 Sacrifice proper (Opfer) becomes 
selfsacrifice (Selbstaufopferung) with an emphasis on reflexivity, and the latter, like the 
former, can be historically traced to religious experience.  Both forms of sacrifice can 
                                                 
4 From the Greek kenosis, or emptiness – per Bubbio, 2.  
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thus be seen as acts of manifestation: traditional (or literal) sacrifice is a manifestation of 
focused violence, whereas kenotic (or figurative) sacrifice is a manifestation of virtue.   
Recounting the virtue-sacrifice described by Meister Eckhart, Bubbio takes 
particular care to highlight the term Abgeschiedenheit: “This term, usually translated as  
‘disinterestedness’ or ‘detachment’ in English, effectively refers to the kenotic emptying 
of the self as a result of the imitation of Christ” (Bubbio, 2). Parallels between this 
language of disinterestedness and the ascetic self-denial espoused by Schopenhauer in the 
final book of The World as Will and Representation are obvious.  
  This recasting of sacrifice in terms of virtue is not merely a religious 
phenomenon. We can observe evidence of this evolution from suppressive to kenotic 
sacrifice in the secular philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly in the 
writings of Kant. In The Metaphysics of Morals, he writes, “... I ought to sacrifice a part 
of my welfare to others without hope of return, because this is a duty, and it is impossible 
to assign determinate limits to the extent of this sacrifice” (Kant, 393). The language of 
self-limitation is hardly a stretch: “the happiness of others is an end that is also a duty; 
however, it is first of all an end in itself… The dynamic described here looks more like a 
withdrawing of my welfare to ‘make room for others,’ rather than a suppression of my 
welfare” (Bubbio, 30). In this capacity, it would appear that sacrifice (or, in the very 
least, the willingness to engage in sacrifice) has both a functional and a fundamental role 
to play in Kant’s perception of our pursuit of the Good. “One can think of Kant’s view 
this way: If an act requires no sacrifice, then it can produce no value, and therefore no 
moral value” (Sidney, 83). In Kant’s view,  
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one should act toward humans by sacrificing any conflicting personal 
desires, and by considering only the duty to act for their benefit. Kant used 
the term “sacrifice” in just this way, when he said, “overcoming such a 
desire always costs the subject some sacrifice… to do that which one does  
not quite like to do.” (Critique of Practical Reason, [84]) (Sidney, 86)  
  
This, then, is the intellectual landscape in which the young Schopenhauer finds himself at 
the start of the 19th century: a world in which (a) sacrifice is a fundamental component 
of the human experience, (b) sacrifice has moved, religiously and philosophically, from 
the traditional to the kenotic, and, following Kant, (c) sacrifice is in some sense a duty 
rather than a prerogative.  
  
2.1.2 Sacrifice in the East  
Schopenhauer famously asserted that the Upanishads amount to “the most profitable and 
sublime reading that is possible in the world” (PP, 397). The impact of Eastern 
philosophy upon his intellectual development cannot be overstated, and in his biography,  
Cartwright hails Schopenhauer as “the first major Western philosopher to seriously 
consider Eastern thought” (Cartwright, ix). With this in mind, no adequate discussion of  
Schopenhauer’s views can confine itself to the cultural legacy and philosophical 
surroundings in 19th century Europe. It must also account for the impact of Hinduism 
and Buddhism upon his philosophical project.  
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  We have seen that, with the sophistication of early Western thought and the move 
from paganism to Christianity, sacrifice evolved in focus from outward-facing (gain-
based) to inward-facing (virtue-based). Does sacrifice play a similarly central role in the 
Eastern thought to which Schopenhauer would have been exposed? Girard suggests as 
much: “[the] religious reflection of the Vedic world is entirely centered on sacrifice” 
(Girard, 34). While Girard has in mind the traditional sacrifice of early Western 
pagandom, characterized by narrowly focused violence with the goal of a specific 
beneficial outcome, it would be a mistake to suggest that virtue sacrifice never took root 
on the subcontinent. In the Upanishads, the text revered by Schopenhauer from his 
introduction to it at the age of twenty-six until his death, sacrifice seems to have 
undergone some sort of cultural change.  
  
He is the sun dwelling in the bright heaven; He is the air dwelling in 
space; He is the fire burning on the altar; He is the guest dwelling in the 
house. He dwells in man. He dwells in those greater than man. He dwells 
in sacrifice… (Upanishads, 81)  
  
The pronominal “He” in this excerpt is not the singular God of the Western tradition, but 
rather Atman, the soul, which knows itself best when it recognizes itself as 
indistinguishable from Brahman, the Universal. As Swami Paramananda puts it:  
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Although this Atman dwells in the heart of every living being, yet It is not 
perceived by ordinary mortals because of Its subtlety. It cannot be 
perceived by the senses; a finer spiritual sight is required. The heart must 
be pure and freed from every unworthy selfish desire; the thought must be 
indrawn from all external objects; mind and body must be under control; 
when the whole being thus becomes calm and serene, then it is possible to 
perceive that effulgent Atman (Upanishads, 60).  
  
The parallels between this Atman / Brahman duality and Schopenhauer’s concept of the 
interplay between the individual and the whole are clear. At the conclusion of the second 
book of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer takes special care to 
underscore that the nature of the individual reflects the nature of the whole, saying,  
“[everyone] is thus in this double respect the entire world itself, the microcosm, finds 
both sides of it whole and complete in himself” [sic] (WWRI 207, 193g).  
The attendant language of self-limitation, of self-forfeiture and thus self-sacrifice, 
bears a striking resemblance of the language of withdrawal which, in the Christian era, 
grew up around sacrifice in the West. The spiritual connotation of sacrifice in both 
Western and Eastern cultures thus converge despite following very different paths along 
the way. Historically and globally, as comprehension of the place of humanity within the 
physical and metaphysical world has grown more sophisticated, there is a consensus 
among contemporary scholars that sacrifice has moved from currency to kenosis. As an 
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intellectual heir to Kant and devout student of Eastern philosophy, Schopenhauer was 
unlikely to have overlooked this.  
  
2.2 Sacrifice in The World as Will and Representation  
In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer uses two distinct terms for  
“sacrifice.” The first of these is Entbehren, given in the Grimm Deutsches Wörterbuch as 
synonymous with the Latin carere (to lack, to be deprived of). The second term 
Schopenhauer uses to invoke the concept of sacrifice is Aufopfern, aligned with the Latin 
mactare (to slaughter, sacrifice, or honor) and offere (to offer). Thus, in our consideration 
of sacrifice in Schopenhauer’s central work, we must be aware that two distinct 
variations of the term are presented: Entbehrung is something which one endures; 
Aufopferung is something which one enacts.  
  
2.2.1 Sacrifice as Entbehrung  
In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer uses the word Entbehrung only 
three times. The first occurs in §16 in the context of a broader discussion of the suffering 
inherent in the will-oriented human life. It is rendered by Aquila, in line with the Grimm 
translation to Latin, as deprivation: “One saw that deprivation, suffering, did not proceed 
immediately or necessarily from not possessing something, but only from waiting to 
possess and yet not possessing…” (WWRI 124, 104g). While this use of Entbehrung 
speaks volumes in the context of Schopenhauer’s philosophical project, it doesn’t shed 
much light onto our discussion of sacrifice as an activity.  
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  The second appearance of Entbehrung occurs in §55, where it is invoked by 
Schopenhauer to demonstrate that human beings, unlike lower forms of life, have a sense 
of future-oriented motivation.  
  
In most cases, aside from entirely insignificant actions, abstract, thought 
out motives determine us, not present impressions. Therefore, every 
individual sacrifice made for the moment is relatively easy, but every 
renunciation horrifically difficult; for the former bears only on the present 
rushing past us, while the latter bears on the future and therefore 
incorporates countless sacrifices as its equivalent. [italics mine] (WWRI 
352, 352g)  
  
This instance of “sacrifice” tells us less about the human attitude towards sacrificial 
activity (we dislike it), and more about the human attitude towards sustained activity (we 
dislike it immensely). Our ability to conceptualize the future thus stands as a barrier to 
our engagement in long-term self-deprivation. While a valuable component of  
Schopenhauer’s philosophical project, this account is more immediately relevant to a 
discussion of willing than one of sublimation.  
  Similarly, the mention of Entbehrung in §65 aligns better with a sense of hardship 
than it does with our description of sacrifice as a kenotic act of self-subsumption. But it 
does supply us with some useful context for the mindset of the person undergoing such a 
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hardship — namely, that such an individual desires, consciously or subconsciously, for 
his fellows to undergo similar hardship.  
  
Because the human being is a phenomenon of will illuminated by the 
clearest cognizance, he always measures actual and felt satisfaction of his 
will against the merely possible satisfaction that cognizance holds before 
him. From this originates envy: every sacrifice is infinitely increased by 
the enjoyments of others, and eased by knowledge that others also endure 
the same sacrifice. Ills that are common to all and inseparable from human 
life trouble us little, as likewise those that pertain one’s climate, to one’s 
land as a whole. Recollection of greater sufferings than our own stills the 
latter’s pain; sight of the sufferings of others alleviated one’s own. [italics  
mine] (WWRI 423. 430g)  
  
Thus the suffering of others assuages our own suffering; we desire for others to suffer in 
order for our suffering to be mitigated. This becomes a relevant psychological impulse 
when we consider, in Chapter Three, the sensation of sharing (or, more accurately, the 
lack thereof) experienced by the artist.  
  
2.2.2 Sacrifice as Aufopferung  
We first encounter the term Aufopferung in §28. Schopenhauer uses the term in a 
botanical capacity, in order to underscore the omnipresence of the will in all things, even 
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mindless things such as plants. The reference is designed to drive home the fact that 
every living thing, high or low, is bent on reproduction of its species even at the expense 
of its individual perpetuation.5 The goal for Vallisneria is reproduction, which 
Schopenhauer takes to be a driving force behind all conscious and unconscious acts of 
animals and plants alike. This sort of sacrifice is not quite what we have in mind, 
however. While it is action-based as opposed to passivity-based, the action in question is, 
in some vital sense, hardwired. We, like Vallisneria, cannot help but concern ourselves 
with the perpetuation of our species, and though we can choose whether or not to 
participate in such perpetuation, we cannot choose whether or not to be aware of its 
importance.  
  The appearance of Aufopferung in the “Critique of Kantian Philosophy” is  
similarly irrelevant to our discussion, based as it is in the context of casting aside of 
reason in favor of impulse.6 The truly telling instances of Aufopferung occur between the 
given points: the first in §60 and the second in §68. We shall deal with these two usages 
of the term in the order in which they appear.  
  In §60, Schopenhauer’s preoccupation is with affirmation of the will, which he  
                                                 
5 “When with the arrival of the season for blossoming, the female flower of the dioecious plant Vallisneria 
unravels the spirals of the stem by which it had been held at the bottom of the water, and thereby rises to 
the surface, exactly at the same time, the male flower, which has been growing attached to the short 
stem at the bottom of the water, tears itself loose from the latter and thus reaches the surface with 
sacrifice of its l ife” [italics mine] (WWRI 205, 191g).  
6 “In nearly all  human beings, reason has an almost exclusively practical orientation. Should this be 
abandoned, however, thought loses its rule over action… Thus if a person lets his action be directed not 
by his thought but by present impressions, almost in the manner of animals, one calls him non-rational 
(without thereby accusing him of moral badness)… He cannot be, at that, a truly good person, l ike many 
who cannot see someone unfortunate without helping him, even with sacrifices, while on the other hand 
leaving their debts unpaid” (WWRI 599, 615g).  
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equates to affirmation of the body. Characteristic of affirmation of the body is the urge 
towards maintenance of the body, and, in the same breath, towards maintenance of the 
species.  
  
Maintenance of the body by its own forces is so low a degree of 
affirmation of will that, were it left voluntarily at that, we might assume 
that with the death of the body the will making its appearance in it is also 
to be extinguished. But even when satisfaction of the sex drive goes 
beyond affirmation of one’s own existence, which occupies so short a 
time, affirming life for an indefinite time beyond the death of the 
individual… This view of [affirmation extending beyond one’s own body] 
is depicted mythically in the dogma of the Christian doctrine of faith, 
according to which we all have a share in the original sin of Adam… In 
consequence of this, on the one hand, [that doctrine of faith] views every 
individual as identical with Adam, representative of the affirmation of life, 
and to that extent as having fallen subject to sin (original sin), suffering, 
and death. On the other hand, its recognition of the Idea shows it that 
every individual is also identical with the Redeemer, representative of the 
denial of the will for life, and is to that extent participant in his 
selfsacrifice, redeemed by his merit, and rescued from the bonds of sin 
and death, i.e., of the world (Romans 5, 12-21). [italics mine] (WWRI 
383384, 387-388g)  
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At first glance, this treatment of the concept of sacrifice doesn’t seem to add anything 
new to what has already been discussed, and set aside, regarding an instinctual preference 
for continuation of the species over continuation of the individual. But vital here is the 
implication that sacrifice, or at the very least awareness of its necessity, is both 
fundamentally human and universally shared. Schopenhauer is suggesting that Western 
mythology is built in such a way that we do not simply engage in perpetuation choices 
subconsciously, but also consciously. In some sense, we have a conception of the 
necessity of our sacrifice as having been inherited. Every individual, following Adam, is 
both Sinner and Redeemer, sacrificed-for and sacrificing, which in turn suggests that an 
individual particularly well-attuned to the denial of the will for life is more the latter than 
the former. This distinction will factor into our discussion of the artist as sacrific ial in 
Chapter Four, but for now, it suffices to point out that the individual has, at the very least, 
the capacity for sacrifice, and the cultural inheritance that engenders that capacity.  
  Let us now turn to the second relevant appearance of Aufopferung in The World 
as Will and Representation. We encounter this in §68, which, in an appropriate 
counterpoint to the preceding occurrence, deals primarily with the denial of the will 
towards life. It is in this context that Schopenhauer brings us back to a discussion of the 
unity between individuals, again, with the language of sharing and unity.  
  
Just as we earlier saw hate and malice conditioned by egoism and the 
latter resting on cognizance caught up in the principium individuationis, 
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so we found the origin and essence of righteousness - and then, as it goes 
further, love and generosity up to their highest degrees - to be penetration 
of the principium individuationis, which alone, insofar as it nullifies the 
distinction between one’s own and other individuals, can render possible 
and explain that complete goodness of disposition which extends to the 
point of the most unselfinterested love and most generous self-sacrifice  
(WWRI 439, 447g).  
  
This passage uncovers a deeply important truth about Schopenhauer’s philosophical 
conception of sacrifice (or self-sacrifice): that sacrifice is the activity of great love, that 
such a level of love can only be attained through rejection of individuation in 
comprehension of the whole, and that such a rejection is characteristic of the denial of 
will. He continues:  
  
Namely, when that veil of Maya, the principium individuationis, is so 
greatly lifted from the eyes of a person and he no longer makes the 
egoistic distinction between his own person and others, but participates as 
much in the suffering of other individuals as in his own, and is thereby not 
only helpful to the highest degree but ready to sacrifice his own individual 
whenever a number of others can thereby be rescued, then it follows of 
itself that such a person - who r ecognizes his innermost and true self in all 
beings - must also regard the endless sufferings of all living things as his 
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own, and so appropriate the entire world’s pain… The will now turns 
away from life; it now shudders before its enjoyments, in which it is 
cognizant of its affirmation. Man attains the state of voluntary 
renunciation, resignation, true composer and complete willlessness.  
(WWRI 440,448g)  
  
2.3 The Nature of Sacrifice for Schopenhauer  
Given what we’ve seen regarding Schopenhauer’s use of the concepts of sacrifice and 
hardship in The World as Will and Representation, we can make some basic claims about 
the role which suffering and sacrifice play in the context of his philosophical project.7 
For suffering to be bearable, suffering must be shared; as human beings, we are attuned, 
both by nature and by culture, to the necessity and possible inevitability of sacrifice; and 
sacrificial behavior can be seen as a result of love for the whole, and consequently of 
denial of the self-interested will.  
This final concept of sacrifice as an act of love fits neatly into the mold supplied 
to Schopenhauer, and to us, by the cultural and religious climates of both Europe and  
India at the turn of the century. Sacrifice, as a joint denial of the individual and an 
affirmation of the whole, and this rendering of the concept clearly complements 
Schopenhauer’s adoption of the human-to-universe / Atman-to-Brahman duality. The 
                                                 
7 Evidence of the continuing, and even increasing, attention which Schopenhauer affords the question of 
sacrifice can be found in the increase of the number of references to it between 1819 and 1844. Sacrifice 
as either Entbehrung or [Auf]opferung was present in only seven instances (most of them incidental) in 
the first volume of The World as Will and Representation. By the time the supplemental volume appeared 
twenty-five years later, sacrifice is mentioned on twenty-three separate occasions.  
33  
language of sacrifice in the Upanishads — “The heart must be pure and freed from every 
unworthy selfish desire; the thought must be indrawn from all external objects; mind and 
body must be under control; when the whole being thus becomes calm and serene, then it 
is possible to perceive that effulgent Atman” (Upanishads, 60) — could not be more 
clearly duplicated than it is in The World as Will and Representation — “Man [aware of 
universal suffering] attains the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true composer 
and complete willlessness” (WWRI 440,448g).  
 For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, we can understand sacrifice as 
comprising of the following qualities:  
  
1. kenotic (loss-oriented) as opposed to traditional (gain-oriented),  
2. intentional (we, unlike Vallisneria, can choose to prioritize ourselves),   
3. characterized by a denial of the individual will, and thus  
4. inevitable for an individual who inclined towards self-disinterestedness (“all true 
and pure love is compassion” (WWRI 436, 444g), and compassion subsequently 
leads to the egolessness which characterizes true sacrifice).  
  
Having examined both the textual and contextual evidence of Schopenhauer’s 
engagement with the concept of sacrifice, we are free to begin asking questions about 
what sorts of individuals might exemplify this concept. The holy ascetic of the fourth 
book could certainly qualify as sacrificial in the sense in which we have explored it. 
Could the artist? 
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Chapter Three: The Artist as Genius and Madman 
  
It is surely not an accident that Schopenhauer invokes the concept of “genius” 
only with reference to the artist — to whom could we otherwise attach such a label? To 
the great scientist, perhaps, adept at uncovering evidence-based truths about the natural 
world? Yet Schopenhauer would likely say of such an individual that while he 
demonstrates great talent (say, for reason or mathematics), the great scientist is still 
operating within the realm of the phenomenal world. He may exceed the common man 
with regard to the veracity of his insights into that world, but ultimately, he inhabits the 
same world as the rest of us; he lacks the particular brand of pure consciousness by 
means of which the genius-artist is defined.   
  This chapter is dedicated to an exploration of what qualities the genius-artist 
embodies for Schopenhauer. The focus is, once again, on both his explicit and implicit 
presentations of his view on the matter. We begin by sketching out a cultural framework 
for Schopenhauer’s concept of the artist — namely, the artist as he is generally conceived 
in Romantic Era Germany — and proceed to offer a more developed portrait of the artist 
by drawing upon textual evidence from The World as Will and Representation.  
  
3.1 The Artist in Romantic Era Germany  
As with his understanding with of “sacrifice,” Schopenhauer’s engagement with “genius” 
did not develop in a cultural and intellectual vacuum. Indeed, he openly cites the 
anecdotal emotional turmoil of “great geniuses, e.g., Rousseau, Byron, Alfieri” as 
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evidence of his claims about the narrowness of the boundary between genius and 
madness (WWRI 235, 225g). It is only appropriate, therefore, to preface his explicit 
treatments of the nature of the genius-artist with a brief exploration of the social 
constructs of genius which surrounded him during the nascent stages of The World as 
Will and Representation. Given the heavy lines of connection that Schopenhauer draws 
between the genius-artist and the risk of madness, it is hardly surprising that the 
archetype of the “tortured artist” is perhaps most at home in the culture of nineteenth 
century Europe.  
  Peter Watson, in his treatise on German intellectualism, sets the somewhat rocky 
cultural terrain of the era by quoting Eliza Butler: “Romanticism is rooted in torment and 
unhappiness and, at the end of the eighteenth century, the German-speaking countries 
were the most tormented in Europe” (Watson, 195). The effect of struggle against French 
forces which characterized the era was inescapable — “a whole generation grew up in its 
shadow” (Blackbourn, 57). In such a world, where chaos and suffering were widespread 
and a sense of control was fast fading, German-speakers found themselves focusing 
inward rather outward for a sense of expression and a degree of self-confirmation.  
  
In the first instance (and for the first time), it was realized that morality 
was a creative process but, in the second place, and no less important, it 
laid new emphasis on creation, and elevated the artist alongside the 
scientist. It is the artist who creates, who expresses himself, who creates 
values. The artist does not discover, calculate, deduce, as the scientist (or 
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philosopher) does. The artist invents his goal and then realizes his own 
path toward that goal. … At a stroke, art was transformed and enlarged, no 
longer mere imitation, or representation, but expression, a far more 
important, more significant and ambitious activity. (Watson, 195)  
  
The artist, accordingly, was the primary societal conduit for such expression. The art of 
the time was therefore largely self-absorbed — it dealt less with the glory or suffering of 
the community (there was little of the former and much of the latter readily at hand), and 
more with the glory or suffering of the individual. This is not to say that the inward focus 
of the Romantic artist betrayed a lack of concern for others. On the contrary, the 
Romantic artist can be seen as delving deeply into himself (and communicating his 
findings through art) as a method of getting to the truth of what lies in the deepest parts 
of all of us. Long before Schopenhauer’s philosophical debut, this concept of the artist as 
a kind of “emotional spokesperson” was becoming fairly well established in German 
culture.  
  
The particular, [the Romanticists] thought, should be an individual 
expression of the whole. ‘Every man,’ wrote Schleiermacher, ‘should in 
his own way represent humanity,’ or as Friedrich Schlegel said, ‘No man 
is only a man, but really and in truth he can and should also be the whole 
of humanity.’ In the same manner the whole is also an individuality, and 
the Romanticists could not conceive of the existence of the particular apart 
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from the totality… In another place [Schlegel] wrote, “Entire humanity 
shall become an individuality, a lovingly united and morally developed 
whole… (Anderson, 303)  
  
Thus despite the fact that Schopenhauer’s presentation of the dynamic between the 
individual and the whole is often seen as novel, and more heavily influenced by the Far 
East than the goings-on in turn-of-the-century Jena, it is clear that the intellectual 
precursors to his philosophical system were already in motion long before he set foot in 
the University of Göttingen. The emphasis upon interconnectivity made isolation, actual 
or perceived, all the more dangerous. “The individual became uprooted, isolated, 
anxious. The uncertainty excited his nerves and strained his emotions. He confronted a 
world of turmoil and danger, the harsh impact of unexpected forces… and he craved 
unity with those capable of aiding him” (Anderson, 307).  
  Why is this Romantic yearning for unity so relevant in discussions of the artist? 
Because, for Schopenhauer, the artist is condemned by his very nature to have no or very 
little access to this union, and this exposes him to a highly unique and deeply meaningful 
brand of suffering. This is not to say that the artists of the era were unappreciated or 
uncelebrated. Indeed, as Turner points out, “[the] artist came to be thought of and 
discussed as someone who was larger than life and certainly larger, truer, better, and 
more inspired than the rest of the human beings in whose society he dwelled and whose 
society and values he challenged” (Turner, 137). In this way, the artist came to represent 
a great degree of power and importance – but, like any powerful and important figure, the 
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esteem in which he was held acted as a dividing agent between the artist himself and his 
fellows.  
  
3.2 Schopenhauer’s Portrait of the Artist  
We have seen in Chapter One (1.3) that Schopenhauer spends a great deal of time 
exploring the role that art plays in relation to the Ideas and our cognizance of them.  
Schopenhauer’s discussion of art is largely built on the concept of passage from ordinary 
cognizance to cognizance of the Ideas, and thus undertaken specifically with the observer 
of great art in mind. Yet despite the fact that Schopenhauer generally shrinks from 
engaging with the concept of the creator or artist in overt detail, he is not wholly silent on 
the subject. We find traces of artistic description throughout the third book of The World 
as Will and Representation, and again in the supplementary volume. Given the 
supporting cultural evidence of what qualities the artist was likely to have embodied, we 
can refine Schopenhauer’s explicit claims to a clear, if general, outline of the artist.  
As discussed in Chapter One, Schopenhauer repeatedly drives home the fact that 
art is defined by the disinterestedness it engenders. “What mode of cognition… is 
concerned with that aspect of the world that is alone truly essential, standing beyond and 
independent of all relation?” he asks (WWRI 228, 217g). What is the most basic 
engagement with complete objectivity, the pure and willless contemplation of truth? In 
Schopenhauer’s view: art. And consequently, the purveyor of art - that is, the artist - is 
the individual characterized by “a predominating capacity for such contemplation” 
(WWRI 229, 218g).  
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  Thus we must resist the urge to consider the genius-artist merely a fortunate 
confluence of natural talent and technical prowess. The issue is not one of talent. As  
Young points out:   
  
There is, Schopenhauer emphasizes, a difference, not of degree but of kind 
between genius and talent. While genius belongs only to someone who has 
freed himself from subjectivity, talent remains within the province of 
ordinary, will-governed consciousness” [italics mine] (Young, 126).  
  
In Chapter 31 of the supplementary volume, Schopenhauer states this explicitly, 
suggesting that the artist transcends mere talent by virtue of his ability to perceive a 
deeper, more nuanced, world. The artist to whom Schopenhauer refers in his writings is 
therefore not defined by his technical skill — though he must possess it to the extent that 
it makes his aesthetic experience communicable — but rather by his capacity for 
selfsubsumption. The artist, during creation, transcends his natural, will-driven 
egocentricity and becomes, instead, “purely cognizant subject, clear eye of the world” 
(WWRI 229, 218g). In this sense, then, we would do better to understand genius as a skill 
rather than a mystical, ill-defined affinity towards excellence. And this skill for 
disinterest contemplation, suggests Schopenhauer, is rare.  
  
The ordinary person… [is] altogether incapable of at least sustaining a 
regard that is wholly disinterested in every sense…; he can only direct his 
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attention to things insofar as they have some, even if a most indirect, 
relation to his will (WWRI 231, 220g).   
  
In this way, the artist is defined by his treatment of his preoccupation as an end-in-itself, 
while the ordinary individual — afflicted by ordinary consciousness — treats any and all 
preoccupations as a means to another, self-interested end.  
  Schopenhauer does not reduce his artist to a mere vessel of contemplation. In his 
albeit brief discussion of the genius in §36, he offers two explicit portrayals of the artist’s  
“contemplative gift” as engendering a certain level of unhappiness.  
  
This is the explanation of the liveliness to the point of restlessness in 
individuals of genius, the present rarely being able to satisfy them because 
it does not fill their consciousness. This gives them that character of 
unresting endeavor, that ceaseless search for objects that are new and 
worthy of regard, as well as the almost never satisfied demand for beings 
who are like themselves, up to their level, with whom they might 
communicate. Your ordinary fellow, by contrast, entirely filled and 
satisfied by the ordinary present, gets absorbed in it, and then finding his 
equals everywhere, he obtains that particular feeling of comfort in 
everyday life that is denied to the genius. (WWRI 230, 219g)  
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Thus the artist finds himself in a position of unique loneliness: unlike his less 
contemplative fellows, he does not have the luxury of taking solace in the shared quality 
of suffering. He is, rather, a focal point of suffering; it is concentrated on him in a way 
that it is not concentrated on the common man. Schopenhauer characterizes him as an 
individual cursed to live “an essentially lonely life” (WWRII 441, 444g). Subsequently, 
Schopenhauer’s proof of the artist’s rarity is an empirical one, suggesting that this rarity 
should be evident.   
  
We ought to know that poor minds are the rule, good minds the exception, 
eminent minds extremely rare, genius a portentum. How otherwise could a 
human race, consisting of some eight hundred million individuals, have so 
much still left to discover, to invent, to think up, and to say after six 
millennia (WWRII 165, 160g)?  
  
In this way, Schopenhauer buttresses the observation that geniuses are not the rule by 
pointing to all that remains for the human race to achieve.  
  Given this repeated characterization of the uncommonness of the artist, it is 
unsurprising that Schopenhauer continues his description of the artist by suggesting that 
the rare sensitivity displayed by the artist can easily cross into the realm of mental illness:   
  
Thus they will judge or narrate matters too objectively for their own good, 
not leave unsaid what it would be shrewder to leave unsaid, etc. Thus 
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finally, they have a tendency toward monologues and can in general show 
a number of weakness that actually approaches madness (WWRI 234,  
224g).   
  
Perhaps nowhere is the genius-madness dynamic more explicitly revealed by 
Schopenhauer than in §36 of The World as Will and Representation, where he invokes 
his beloved Plato and Goethe to evince “not only the suffering, the essential martyrdom 
of genius as such, but also its steady passage into madness” (WWRI 235, 225g).8  
At every turn, Schopenhauer’s praise for the genius-artist is tempered by his 
portrayal of such an individual as deeply unhappy:  
  
It has yet to be observed here that the very passion that is a condition of 
genius, combined with its vivid apprehension of things, in practical life 
where the will comes into play, especially with sudden occurrences, 
entails so great an arousal of the emotions that it disturbs and confuses the 
intellect… For this reason, the true genius is altogether only suited for 
theoretical accomplishments, for which he can choose and await his time, 
                                                 
8 Schopenhauer draws Plato into the discussion of artistic madness by reviewing his famous Allegory of 
the Cave: “In the myth of the dark cave… Plato expresses it by way of the assertation that those who have 
viewed the true sunlight and actually existing things (the Ideas) outside the cave can afterwards, since 
their eyes have become disaccustomed to darkness, no longer see in the cave, no longer recognize aright 
the shadowy images below, and are for that reason ridiculed for their blunders by the others, who have 
never gotten away from the cave and these shadowy images” (WWRI 235, 224g). Schopenhauer goes on 
to cite Goethe’s play Torquato Tasso, the eponymous subject of which suffered famously from acute 
mental i l lness despite being one of the most esteemed European poets of the 16 th century (WWRI 235, 
225g).  
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which will be precisely when the will is entirely at rest, and no wave 
disturbs the pure mirror surface of perception of the world; by contrast, 
the genius is clumsy and useless in practical life, hence also usually 
unhappy (WWRII 332, 320g).  
  
What can we glean from such a bleak picture of the lot of the artist? Primarily, that by 
gaining access to the occasional higher pleasures of disinterestedness (i.e., “aesthetic 
contemplation”), the artist loses access to the more consistent lower pleasures of 
everyday will satisfaction. He is unable to engage with the phenomenal world with the 
same level of transparent naiveté that characterizes the actions of ordinary men.  
  Thus the unifying theme of Schopenhauer’s portrait of the artist is otherness, i.e., 
how alien the artist is from others. The artist is beyond and above the common man, 
intellectually isolated, able to access perceptive states which cannot be shared more 
directly than through second-hand artistic communication. He finds himself both at a 
great distance from the human race and moved by a compulsion to soothe it with the 
production and distribution of his art (this “compulsion to soothe” will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Four). In this capacity, the artist is presented as mutation operating 
within the will-world: an accident, but a happy one for the rest of us. In an evolutionary 
schema wholly occupied with self-interest and perpetuation, the genius is a monstrum per 
excessum — monstrous by way of excess as opposed to defect (WWRII 427, 429g), and 
both suffering and salvific by way of this excess.  
  To summarize Schopenhauer’s envisioned qualities of the genius artist: he is  
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1. endowed with a rare and acute capacity for pure contemplation, i.e. for abstraction 
from egocentric engagement with the world around him,  
2. afflicted necessarily with a degree of emotional turmoil as a result of this 
capacity, i.e. he finds himself lacking in the support of equals and — having seen 
the proverbial light, albeit in fits and starts — has difficulty engaging with the 
ordinary world on an ordinary level,  
3. rendered restless and dissatisfied by the fleeting nature of aesthetic transcendence, 
unable either to sustain such transcendence ad infinitum or to engage in willful 
behavior with the mindless pleasure of the ordinary man.  
  
Simply put — and unsurprisingly, given the cultural perception of the artist at the time of  
Schopenhauer’s philosophical development — the artist suffers. Does the suffering of the 
artist enable us, as ordinary individuals, to suffer less?  
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Chapter Four: The Artist as Sacrificial  
  
In Plato’s Ion, Socrates calls the poet “a light and winged and holy thing, and 
there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and reason 
is no longer in him” (Plato, 9). We have seen that Schopenhauer’s artist shares a similar 
propensity for losing himself: “genius is the capacity… for losing oneself in perception”  
(WWRI 229, 219g). Plato’s conviction that the poet engages in a kind of 
doublecognizance also carries over to Schopenhauer. The artist “cannot literally be in a 
trancelike Bacchic transport [Rausch]... But his not being fully in rational control of what 
he is doing in performance, and his being genuinely moved to emotions disjointed from 
the reality he believes to obtain, need not conflict with his calculating attitude towards 
the audience” (Janaway, Images 23). The artist, then, must be at once possessed by 
aesthetic consciousness and sufficiently in control of his intellectual / technical capacities 
to record his experiences. He must be both passive and participatory. If he were not the 
former, he could not overcome his own self-interest; if not the latter, the artwork could 
not come to communicable fruition.  
  Schopenhauer’s artist both experiences the aesthetic state and acts as a conduit for 
its distribution. For Schopenhauer, the output of great art is universal That is to say, great 
art inspires in the capable or receptive observer the transcendent sublimity of having 
slipped the yoke of ordinary consciousness.9 The observer of great experiences the great 
                                                 
9 See Young, particularly, for a thorough treatment of the transcendental  experience of great art.  
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serenity which springs from personal disinterest. The input of great art is likewise 
universal, for Schopenhauer: the artist is moved to an experience of the aesthetic state by 
forces or compulsions beyond his control, and relays that experience to the audience 
through the artwork. Any secondary claims we might make about the motivations which 
drive artists are irrelevant. The artist who creates for fame or profit — that is, the artist 
who creates from a conscious and calculated decision to do so — is not “great” in the 
sense that Schopenhauer uses the word. The great artist, the true genius, is moved to 
create whether or not he wishes to — his capacity for “pure cognizance” is an 
involuntary quality of his constitution.  
  Thus, for Schopenhauer, the artist during creation is a man outside of himself — 
devoid of self-interest, beyond the scope of will, the artist is free from the prosaic pains 
of everyday life. Yet the aesthetic state, like madness, is episodic by definition: even the 
most aesthetically contemplative individual remains an individual, and returns as a matter 
of course to the world of willing.   
  
[Aesthetic consciousness] is in no way the case in every moment of [the 
genius’] life, since the great, although spontaneous, exertion that is 
required for will- free apprehension of ideas necessarily abates and leaves 
those individuals standing for long intervals, with respect to both strengths 
and weaknesses, rather like ordinary people (WWRI 232, 222g).  
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In such intervals, in periods of return, the artist must feel the loss acutely, having 
glimpsed the world beyond suffering and yet subsequently been cast down into the 
miserable solidity of the will-world with the rest of us. No conscious activity or set of 
activities can return him to that state at will. The portrait that Schopenhauer paints is thus 
of a man with something of an imperfect superpower. The artist is uniquely equipped to 
access pure consciousness, by some intellectual fluke and a certain delicacy of perception 
and imagination, but he can neither maintain such a state indefinitely nor summon it on 
command. Put simply: the artist is powerless to affect his own inspiration, and in his 
periods of ordinary subjective consciousness, he must be acutely aware of his 
powerlessness in a way that the ordinary man is not.  
  Thus while Schopenhauer’s socio-ethical framework is one deeply steeped in 
equality and the shared qualities of suffering, there is nothing shared about the suffering 
experienced by the artist. The artist is alone and, as Schopenhauer himself grants, 
fundamentally lonely — time and again, he experiences a loss to which the common man 
is not exposed.  
  Here, a potential objection comes to light: What about the artist’s expiration-of 
experience makes it more painful than the common man’s? The latter experiences similar 
loss every time he moves away from the painting, finishes the film, leaves the symphony, 
etc. This objection fails to take hold, however, when we consider Schopenhauer’s artist in 
terms of Plato’s obvious influence.   
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The god takes reason away from poets, and uses them as his servants, as 
he also uses the pronouncers of oracles and holy prophets, namely, in 
order that we who hear them can know that it is not these men who, bereft 
of reason, utter these words, but it is the god himself who speaks them, 
and that through them he is addressing us (Plato, 12).  
  
If the artist, through conveyance, inhabits a secondary level of aesthetic consciousness — 
as Plato claims and Schopenhauer seems to maintain — then we, as the audience, inhabit 
a tertiary level. We are further removed than the artist from the experience of aesthetic 
consciousness, and just as the vividness of our experience is lessened by the degree of 
our separation, so too is the vividness of our loss.  
  The conscientious objector might press further: Does the comparatively greater 
suffering of the artist necessarily denote sacrifice as such? Or is the proportional benefit 
we derive from art merely a fortunate accident? My response to this question (and, more 
vitally, a consistently Schopenhauerian response to this question) is multifaceted.  
Let us begin with a brief discussion of the artist’s purported function as a load 
bearer. Schopenhauer’s conviction that great art is beneficial to the observer cannot be 
called into question — so explicit is he in this belief that he spends a full quarter of his 
philosophical masterwork discussing the ins and the outs of its effects. The true question 
must revolve around the intention of the artist, that is, whether or not the artist shares his 
art with the rest of us with the aim of facilitating those benefits.  
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  It seems feasible that this mechanism is in play, for the artist, though perhaps 
subconsciously. Support for such a claim can be grounded in the Fourth Book of The  
World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer’s ethical system is built upon 
compassion, and compassion is, in his view, the reflection of an instinctual mirroring of 
the Self and the Other, i.e., the pure love that “regards the fate of other individuals and 
one’s own as utterly equivalent” (WWRI 435, 433g). Given the cultural climate in which 
Schopenhauer and his philosophy came of age, and the Romantic Era emphasis on the 
connection of the individual and whole, his emphasis on compassion is hardly surprising.  
We are compassionate because we are recipients of universal hardship. “Most important, 
we are compassionate because we realize that if one person injures another, the person in 
some way injures himself or herself” (Watson, 332).  
  The artist, as an individual uniquely adept at attaining pure consciousness and 
therefore pure compassion, must feel this division between others and himself as 
uniquely thin. We turn again to Schopenhauer, who declares that the non-self- interested 
individual, by virtue of his suspension of Self, must “regard the endless sufferings of all 
living things as his own, and so appropriate the entire world’s pain” (WWRI 439, 447g). 
Given this characterization, we must assume that the artist is disposed to compassion on a 
much greater scale than the ordinary individual, and that, by virtue of being so disposed, 
the artist thus acts with a mind towards lessening the suffering of others.  
Elsewhere, Schopenhauer speaks of genius as being designed for service.   
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Genius… consists in an abnormal surplus of intellect for which a use can 
be found only by spending it on what is of a general character of 
existence; thereby, it is then subject to service to the human race as a 
whole, just as the normal intellect is to the individual (WWRII 427, 429g).  
  
In other words, genius is simply too great in scope to not be used compassionately.  
Our hypothetical dissenter might respond to this line of reasoning by invoking the 
age-old adage that correlation does not necessitate cause. Yes, the artist suffers, and we 
benefit, but does the artist suffer because we benefit? Simply put, is the artist’s suffering 
a necessary component of the palliative quality of great art?  
At this juncture, we must recall the discussion of the evolution of the concept of  
“sacrifice” in Chapter Two. As sacrifice has moved from an act of mimetic violence to an 
act of mimetic virtue, it has become characterized less by destruction and more by self 
limitation. In modern European history, religious piety and self-sacrifice are as tightly 
bound as any two concepts can be. And Schopenhauer falls into step with this intellectual 
heritage precisely where we might expect him to. In §68, Schopenhauer offers a portrait 
of “the saintly individual” that looks remarkably familiar.  
  
[The] inner essence of saintliness, self-renunciation, the killing of selfwill, 
asceticism, is pronounced as denial of the will for life occurring after 
complete cognizance of its own essence has become a quieter of all its 
willing (WWRI 444, 453g).  
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The saint, characterized by an extreme denial of the will and ascension to pure 
consciousness, functions much like the artist, in Schopenhauer’s view. Both the artist and 
the saint are defined by self-limitation and self-forfeiture; their mutual activity is kenosis. 
The genius-artist is thus sacrificial on a level that Schopenhauer, to be sure, does not 
explicitly state. Yet given a close examination of his works and his cultural context, it 
seems clear that he must have believed it, or at least this his own philosophy compels him 
to do so.  
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Chapter Five: Contemporary Engagement with the Sacrificial Artist  
  
We have seen throughout this thesis that Schopenhauer’s understanding of, and 
engagement with, both sacrifice and the artist are inimitably tied to the mores and 
sensibilities with which he was culturally inundated. The strength of this bond might give 
rise to the characterization of an exploration of Schopenhauer’s sacrificial artist as a mere 
historical and philosophical curiosity, interesting only insofar as it complements 
discussions of 19th century philosophy and art. I show in this chapter that such a 
characterization is deeply incomplete. My interpretation, which casts Schopenhauer’s 
artist in a sacrificial light, can be shown to have a potentially significant impact upon 
both contemporary ethics and Schopenhauer scholarship at large.  
  The recent revival of interest in Schopenhauer in the context of contemporary 
ethics is one marker for the value inherent in renewed academic engagement with his 
work. In his introduction to the Oxford edition of Schopenhauer’s The Two Fundamental  
Problems of Ethics, Janaway makes this point succinctly:  
  
More recent ethical theorists have not tended to regard Schopenhauer’s 
work as a prime historical reference-point. This means that the links and 
contrasts between Schopenhauer’s ethics and contemporary ethics are 
much less explored than arguably they could or should be. Many of the 
issues around which Schopenhauer’s essays revolve clearly remain central 
to ethics today… As regards the foundation of morals, Schopenhauer’s 
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critique of Kant, combined with the fact that he nonetheless remains 
within the Kantian ambience, gives him much in common with parts of 
contemporary ethical theory, Kantianism being still one of the most 
complete and influential accounts of ethics to date (Janaway, Problems 
xix).  
  
We might add to this list Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, as it remains relevant in 
discussions of empathy-based decision-making in modern ethics. Wolf offers a degree of 
support to this addition in her recent paper, “How Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion 
can contribute to today’s ethical debate,” by outlining Schopenhauer’s rich discourse 
with the contemporary philosophical mainstay of Kantian ethics.  
  
  
Philosophical ethics today has to face the ongoing controversies about 
questions raised in the context of applied ethics. Given this situation, some 
types of theory prove to be rather inadequate right from the outset. This 
holds true for an ethics of pure reason as represented by Kant because 
founding maxims on reason will lead to diverging results in this case… I 
think we do need some general moral conception as a point of reference 
which, however, must be so designed that it can cope with the material 
character of the problems in question and tie in with moral agents’ 
ordinary motivational make-up. Here, Schopenhauer’s ethics of 
compassion can make important contributions. Indeed, one may think that 
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his ethical theory is the most current part of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
(Wolf, 42).  
  
If the connection between the value of a theory of the sacrific ial artist and the 
contemporary revival of Schopenhauerian ethics remains unclear, we ought merely to ask 
ourselves, what unique capacity does the artist possess? As we saw throughout Chapters 
Three and Four, that unique capacity is properly the capacity for self-disinterest, or the 
ability to identify the individual with the universal, or — at the most fundamental level 
— the ability to engage in compassion. Thus an exploration of the compassionate nature 
of the artist does more than clarify or recast Schopenhauer’s understanding of the artist as 
such. On an even broader scale, it contextualizes — or, at least, has the potential to 
contextualize — the artist and the individual within contemporary discussions of 
compassion-based ethics.  
  Given the modern relevance of Schopenhauer’s understanding of the role of  
compassion, and of the artist as a singularly compassionate individual, the rarity of 
substantial academic engagement with the nature of Schopenhauer’s artist is surprising. 
That this silence on the interpretation of the artist as sacrificial permeates even the works 
of the most prominent scholars on Schopenhauer and aesthetics is doubly surprising. For 
instance, in his excellent exploration of Schopenhauer’s philosophical tenets, Young 
references sacrifice only twice, and in both instances the usage is purely incidental.10  
                                                 
10 See Young, pp. 174, 243.  
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Likewise, Magee invokes the concept of sacrifice only a handful of times in The 
Philosophy of Schopenhauer: the only instance in which sacrifice is rendered as 
selfsacrifice, as an activity undertaken, is in the context of Wagner, specifically the plot 
of his opera Lohengrin.11 The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (ed. Janaway) is 
similarly quiet on the subject of sacrifice. Despite the fact that many satellite issues are 
explored in-depth (“Schopenhauer and the Self,” “Ideas and Imagination,” etc.), sacrifice 
does not appear in the volume even once.  
  The lack of contemporary engagement with Schopenhauer’s artist as a 
compassionate and self-sacrificing figure, combined with the demonstrated relevance of  
Schopenhauer’s views to current ethical discussions, speaks to the value of a project such 
as this. The majority of us are not geniuses, as Schopenhauer hastens to remind us; we 
are not commonly equipped to undertake the mission of the great artist. But, in a 
philosophical system characterized by the indivisibility of the individual and the whole, 
discoveries about the nature of the genius artist become discoveries about ourselves. In 
this sense, a discussion of Schopenhauer’s artist and the qualities that he embodies are far 
more than mere historical curiosity. They are valuable markers for what it means to be 
compassionate, self-sacrificing, and — above all — human.  
  
  
  
    
                                                 
11 See Magee, p. 369.  
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